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Federalism and Public Choice
Roderick M. Hills Jr.
Abstract
This paper is a draft chapter for an edited collection on Law and Public Choice
being published by Edward Elgar and edited by Dan Farber and Anne Joseph
O’Connell. The chapter provides an overview of public choice literature regard-
ing three aspects of federalism - exit-based normative justifications for federal
regimes, voice-based normative justifications for federal regimes, and positive
theories for how federal regimes are sustained through the political process. In
general, I suggest that the most promising trend in public choice theory is the ef-
fort of economists, political scientists, and lawyers to tackle the thorny question
of “voice” in federal regimes - that is, how subnational politics differs in fed-
eral regimes from the politics of unitary states. Moreover, the case for federalism
based on exit critically depends on the argument for federalism based on improve-
ment of ”voice.” Otherwise, migration from one city or state to another to escape
predatory regimes would simply be pointless movement out of a ”Leviathan” fry-
ing pan into a ”Leviathan” fire. Public choice theorists seem to have an inveterate
suspicion of claims that subnational government facilitates political participation,
perhaps because the entire tradition of public choice is based on the theoretical
impossibility that collective action can accurately represent individuals’ prefer-
ences and values. Yet nothing in the conventional account of how decentralization
improves political ”voice” is inconsistent with the abstract principles of public
choice theory.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337595
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1To the extent that public choice theory concerns the application of economic method to po litics, then the
literature on fiscal federalism emerging from Charles Tiebout’s seminal 1956 article constitutes a form of public choice
theory.  But fiscal federalism has traditionally been viewed as genealogically distinct from the public choice theory,
because it has its origins in the economics of public finance rather than in the application of economic concepts to
legislatures or elections.   See Dennis C. Mueller 1997 , at 9). As I shall suggest later, this genealogy might be responsible
for the neglect of politics in early economic literature on the T iebout hypothesis.
2There are, for instance, 733 articles in the  westlaw JLR database; There are 2,158 articles in the JSTOR
database  that refer to “Tiebout” and  395 articles in JSTOR that refer to “Wallace Oates” and “Fiscal Federalism.”  
3The contrast between “exit” and “voice” has been a staple of social science discussions of local government
since Albert O . Hirschman’s classic book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
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Federalism and Public Choice
Roderick M. Hills, Jr. 
(To be included in an edited volume entitled “Law and Public Choice,” edited by Anne
O’Connell & Dan Farber)
The public choice literature on federalism and its near-relation, localism, is voluminous in
size but narrow in focus.  If one includes articles on fiscal federalism and Tiebout’s spatial
economies under the rubric of “public choice literature,”1 then the articles in law, political science,
and public economics that refer to public choice concepts number in the thousands.2  Most of this
literature revolves around the idea of mobility between competing subnational jurisdictions.   Less
of the literature focuses on how political activity by voters or politicians in federal regimes differ
from unitary states’ politics.  The literature, in other words, focuses on exit, not voice.3   
The absence of substantial public choice scholarship on democratic behavior in federal
regimes oddly contrasts with the political tradition of federalism in the United States.  The Anti-
Federalists opposed the U.S. Constitution on the ground that only aristocratic elites would be able
to compete in large electoral districts required by a continental nation.  The Jacksonian Democrats
opposed a broad construction of Congress’ power to fund infrastructure on the similar ground that
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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wealthy “monopolists” would exert disproportionate power at the metropolitan centers where the
federal government’s officials would work.  These “voice-based” arguments treat  federalism as a
device by which to reduce slack between the agent (elected officials) and principal (the voters), by
reducing the cost to voters of monitoring the agents’ actions.  Public choice theory does not have
much to say about the merits of this traditional theory of federal democracy, preferring to focus on
the capacity of individuals to discipline officials by exiting, or refusing to enter, badly governed
jurisdictions.
 In what follows, I will describe three aspects of public choice theory and federalism.  First,
I will outline public choice theory’s exit-based normative justifications for federal regimes.  Second,
I will describe voice-based normative justifications for federal regimes that are consistent with public
choice theory, although not public choice theory’s central focus.  Finally, I will examine public
choice theorists’ positive theories for how federal regimes are  sustained through the political
process.   
In general, I will suggest that the most promising trend in public choice theory is the effort
of economists, political scientists, and lawyers to tackle the thorny question of “voice” in federal
regimes – that is, how subnational politics differs in federal regimes from the politics of unitary
states.  Public choice theorists may have an inveterate suspicion of claims that subnational
government is closer to the people or facilitates political participation: Such positions have a sappy
flavor that does not mix well with the public choice theorists’ self-image as  hard-boiled realists free
from illusions about the capacity of individuals to engage in collective action.   William Riker, one
of the founders of  public choice theory, roundly ridiculed such claims on behalf of federalism. 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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4Paul Samuelson’s elegant three-page article, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure ,compares how to define
the optimal consumption of  private and public goods, observing that “no decentralized pricing system can serve to
determine optimally these levels of collective consumption” of the latter.  Tiebout’s article was a response to this
challenge by Samuelson.
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(Riker 1964 at 139-49).  And yet nothing in the conventional account of how decentralization
improves political “voice” is inconsistent with the abstract principles of public choice theory.
Moreover, while sketchy and conflicting, the evidence does not disconfirm the account of
decentralization as improving democratic accountability.   Whatever normative case can be for
federalism depends critically on this voice-based defense of federal regimes.  In particular, the case
for federalism based on exit critically depends on the argument for federalism based on improvement
of “voice.”
I.   Exit-Based Theories of Federalism
Since Wallace Oates revived Charles Tiebout’s Pure Theory of Local  Expenditures in the
late 1960s, there have been numerous refinements of exit-based theories of federalism (Tiebout
1956; Oates 1969).  All of these literatures, however, share the common idea that the power of
subjects to move to or from a regulating jurisdiction improves how these subjects are governed.  
This exit-based literature can be further divided into two categories.  In one strand of
scholarship, economists specializing in public finance focus on mobility as a device for revealing
migrants’ demand for local public goods.   The goal of this literature is to determine whether
Tiebout’s spatial economy can mimic the competitive economy of private firms and thereby solve
the problem posed by Paul Samuelson that no decentralized pricing mechanism can determine the
optimal consumption of public goods (Bowen 1943; Samuelson 1954).4  In a second strand,
economists like James Buchanan and political scientists like Barry Weingast assume not merely that
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government officials are incompetent at determining preferences  but also that they are predatory.
 Decentralization is defended as a device to constrain such incompetent or predatory behavior.   Both
the “public finance” and “public choice” strands share one characteristic in common: Neither has,
but both need, a well-developed theory of subnational politics that would explain how,  why, and
whether subnational officials make decisions in a manner different from national officials. 
A. Mobility as device for revealing subjects’ preferences for local public goods
Charles Tiebout’s landmark article, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures, provides
the most familiar exit-based justification for federalism – that of revealing citizen-consumers’
preferences for local public goods through migration.  Under certain idealized circumstances, the
individual’s decision to migrate to a particular community would reveal that the individual valued
the services provided by the community at the community’s average cost of providing those services.
Migration reveals this information perfectly only if one makes some strong assumptions – for
instance, costless migration, full information  about the different service and tax bundles, a range of
local policies the costs and benefits of which are confined to geographic boundaries of the
communities responsible for them, a “large” supply of communities from  which migrants could
choose, and an ideal city size that community managers will obtain by either encouraging or
discouraging immigration. 
The extent to which these prerequisites either could exist in a theoretical spatial economy or
actually exist in real metropolitan areas are both subjects of intense academic debate.  (Dowding et
al 1994; Donohue 1997).  Much of this debate revolves around the problem of what I shall call the
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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5I borrow the term from Mancur Olson 1969.
6The problem could arise if communities with low taxes and excellent services would attract too much labor,
leaving badly governed communities with a labor shortage.   (Flatters,  Henderson, & M ieszkowski 1974).
7The problem is even more intractable if one assumes that citizen-consumers have different levels of preference
for different public goods.  In such a case, public goods ought to be provided by special districts with overlapping
boundaries that specialize in individual goods – fire, police, education, etc.  The citizen-consumers would migrate to the
intersection of those  districts that jointly provide their ideal mix of goods and fees.  The difficulty with such a solution,
however, is that the collective fees charged by all of the special districts would have to reflect not the average cost of
supplying the package of goods but also the congestion costs of further migration into the land defined by the
intersection.  Otherwise, the geographic space defined by the intersection of district boundaries would become over-
crowded.  (Tolley 1974).   Therefore, one would need to create a single “land-use special district”for each intersected
area of special districts, replacing the fees of the special districts with a single fee for each area of intersection reflecting
the marginal costs of additional migrants to that area. (W ellisch 2000  at 89-90).  The number of special land-use districts
necessary for a single commutershed would be mind-boggling for even a modest number of public services.  
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dilemma of fiscal equivalence, a term I borrow from Olson 1997.5  This dilemma arises from the
tension between two requirements of the Tiebout hypothesis – the requirement that there must be a
“large” number of local governments within a single commutershed and the requirement that each
jurisdiction be sufficiently large in land area to internalize the effects of their activities.   If there are
too few jurisdictions, then homebuyers would have to give up their job to secure their ideal package
of taxes and public services, distorting the market for private labor.6  Likewise, absent a large
number of competing jurisdictions, those  local governments with unique land might have the power
to reduce inefficiently the supply of buildable land (through zoning or other regulation) in order to
extract locational rents from migrants.   But the supply of local governments is obviously not
infinitely elastic: The supply of land being fixed, the supply of jurisdictions can be enlarged only at
the cost of increasing the risk of those governments’ policies leading to external effects.7  The
dilemma of fiscal equivalence, in short, requires a messy compromise between creating a large
number of tiny jurisdictions that bargain imperfectly over the externalities that they impose on each
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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other and a small number of larger jurisdictions that are not genuinely competitive.
1.    Mobility and “Race to the Bottom” Arguments
How well do actual federal systems manage the dilemma of fiscal equivalence?   American
political rhetoric and legal scholarship traditionally have emphasized that mobility of persons and
capital disables subnational governments in undesirable ways from dealing with regulatory problems.
 The idea that interjurisdictional mobility will force states into a “race to the bottom,” undermining
regulatory standards in an undesirable way, was a standard trope of Progressive rhetoric in the late
19th and early twentieth centuries (Graebner 1977).   Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have offered similar rhetoric.    In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 280 (1981), for instance, the Court stated that nationwide surface mining  standards were
necessary “to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in
different states will not be used to undermine the ability of the several states to improve and maintain
adequate standards on coal-mining operations within their borders.”  Legal scholars likewise
frequently invoked the idea that pressure from interstate competition for labor or capital might deter
states from regulating at the ideal level.   (See, e.g., Farber & Frickey 1991 at 76).
Beginning in the 1980s, however, Tiebout literature began to lead legal scholarship to
question this easy assumption that mobility-based constraints on state behavior were necessarily
undesirable.  In one of the earliest extended uses of Tiebout’s work in legal scholarship, Robert
Ellickson offered a  defense of local governments’ autonomously setting voting qualifications,
arguing that voters could “vote with their feet” by migrating to a local government with the voting
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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8Without invoking Tiebout, Ralph Winter had argued in 1977 that competition among states for corporate
charters did not create a “race to the bottom” in corporate law, because managers would seek out the law most
advantageous to shareholders.  Winter’s article was the first shot  in what eventually became a voluminous literature on
whether interstate competition improved corporate law.  But this literature shed little light on the critical issues that any
mobility-based theory of federalism must confront.   Corporate decisions about where to incorporate are only metaphorically
concerned with mobility: They are actually costless decisions to choose a particular law to govern the corporate contract. Thus,
the corporate law literature never addressed the problem of imperfect interstate mobility. Moreover, the literature focused
so heavily on whether managers were the shareholders’ faithful agents that it said little about the problem of externalities on
constituencies other than management and shareholders.
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system that maximized the value of real estate (Ellickson 1982).8  Ten years later, Richard Revesz
argued that, so long as the benefits and costs of industrial relocation are wholly bestowed on local
residents, the local government elected by those residents should make a correct balance of
environmental quality and (say) higher wages resulting from extra capital investment (Revesz 1992).
 Revesz’s arguments attracted vigorous critical responses (see, e.g., Engel 1997), but a consensus
had emerged in the legal scholarship by the late 1990s that the general “race-to-the bottom” theory
had not fared well in the exchange.  (Bratton and McCahery 1997, 219 n. 74)).  
Revesz did not claim that competitive jurisdictions would race to the “top.”  He argued only
that there was no reason to believe that mobility would inevitably lead to suboptimal levels of
regulation, absent such external economies.  In certain policy areas, however, it is widely
acknowledged that external economies are pervasive.  For instance, it has been widely acknowledged
that the redistribution of wealth is properly the responsibility of the national government: The
mobility of indigent households insures that one jurisdiction’s taxation for the relief of poverty will
provide spillover benefits to other jurisdictions to the extent that indigent families settle in the more
generous jurisdiction.  (Paul Peterson  1995).   A more controversial sort of externality can arise if
a jurisdiction taxes mobile capital and myopically ignores the effects of such taxes on industry’s
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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decisions to relocate to other jurisdictions.  Such a tax will tend to induce businesses to leave the
state, providing a windfall to other states – a “fiscal externality” that the taxing state inefficiently
ignores (Gordon 1992; Wildasin 1989). 
 2. The need for a political economy of unitary states 
The possibility of such external effects has led scholars to suggest that interjurisdictional
competition might still lead to the “bottom.”    (Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman 2001, at
136-38; Farber & Frickey 1991, at 76-77).  Such claims amount to no more than the conclusion that
actual locational economies do not actually mimic the results of perfectly competitive markets in
private goods, because citizen-consumers are not perfectly mobile or perfectly informed.  (See, e.g.,
Bratton & McCahery).   This shortcoming of actual federal systems, however, is hardly a damning
indictment of federalism, because no one expects perfection from any form of government. The
appropriate comparison by which to evaluate federal systems is not a perfectly competitive market
for private goods but, rather, a unitary state that lacks decentralized decision-making mechanisms
(Hills 2006).
 The difficulty with much of the exit-based literature on federalism is that it is ill-equipped
to make this comparison, because it lacks a theory of unitary government’s behavior.    Of course,
neither California nor Mayberry perfectly internalizes the costs and benefits of government services:
California is too big, and Mayberry is too small.  But so what?  The issue is not whether federal
regimes achieve perfection but whether they outperform unitary states.    Do the electoral processes
of a unitary state do an equally effective job of ferreting out voters’ preferences?   
Much of the fiscal federalism literature seems incapable of asking this question in a coherent
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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9Wallace Oates, for instance, built the premise of the national legislature’s incapacity such clumsiness into
his“decentralization theorem” by defining the theorem to produce efficiency gains only when compared to a regime in
which a “single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.” (Oates 1972, at 54).
10Oates has implicitly acknowledged the need for some theory of political economy to explain such excessive
uniformity, justifying the exogenous assumption of uniform national policies by citing   “political pressures ... that limit
the capacity of central governments to provide higher levels of public services in some jurisdictions than others.”  (Oates
1991 at 1123).
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way, because it simply assumes  without any argument that centralized governments are remarkably
obtuse and would adopt uniform levels of public goods across the entire nation.9   This is an odd
assumption: there is no a priori reason to believe that (for instance) Congress will provide Arizona
and Maine with the same level of grant for snow plows.  Indeed, a benevolent and perfectly informed
Congress could simply enact local option laws or create special assessment districts to insure policies
that varied by region.  As public choice theorists correctly observe, the literature on fiscal federalism
needs some political economy to explain why and how the unitary state fails to consider the interests
of the citizenry in regionally varied policies.  (Brennan & Buchanan 1980, at 9.9.18; Besley & Coate
2003, at 2612; Lockwood 2006 at 38).10  In short, federalism needs a theory of unitary states as well
as a theory of federalism to justify federal regimes. 
B. Mobility as a device to constrain incompetent or predatory unitary states.    
 Public choice literature  on fiscal federalism, accordingly, tends to focus on why the central
government might fail to respond to citizens’ demand for local variation in public goods.   This
public choice literature tends to follow a similar pattern: The authors present a model of national
legislative behavior that is prone to ignore citizens’ preferences and a model of subnational political
behavior that is constrained by citizen mobility in ways that improves responsiveness to regional
variation.   One can conveniently divide these theories of national legislative behavior into (1)
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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11This premise is contestable because, in theory, national politicians could supply local infrastructure by
authorizing special assessment districts.  
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theories that assume incompetence on the part of the central legislature driven by the individual
legislators’ collective action problems in forming majority coalitions and (2) theories that assume
that centralized legislatures behave in a predatory manner. As I shall suggest below, both sorts of
public choice literature lack a persuasive theory of subnational voice, implicitly assuming that, but
not explaining why,  subnational officials want to maximize the land values, revenues, or tax base
of their jurisdiction.  
1. Central Legislatures’ misallocation of local public goods resulting from
universalistic coalitions
Consider, first, theories of central legislatures’ incompetence.  The most prevalent argument
that centralized legislatures cannot allocate public goods according to variations in local tastes for
them relies on the idea that legislatures cannot form majority coalitions without spreading “pork
barrel” spending around a large – ideally  unanimous or “universal” – set of electoral districts.
(Weingast 1979; Lockwood 2002).    This inability follows from two plausible premises.  First,
public goods provided by the national legislature are funded through uniform taxes.11  Therefore,
each good in any electoral district will be cross-subsidized by taxpayers in other districts.   Second,
the legislature is not governed by any strong majority party leader or other official who could force
individual members to adhere to a platform varying local public goods by regional demand through,
say, local option laws, user fees, special assessment districts, or other decentralizing devices.   Such
a leader, enjoying a de facto national constituency, might internalize the benefits of a balanced
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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budget.  Individual legislators, however, cannot “cut the ribbon” for a balanced budget or a healthy
economy.  They prefer, therefore,  to rely on local public goods that present greater opportunities for
individual credit-taking (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987); Weingast & Shepsle 1981).
In such an environment, strategic voters would rationally vote for  representatives who
aggressively seek national funding for local public goods, anticipating that, if one representative
were to abstain from seeking such funding, then the savings in tax dollars would simply be re-
distributed among other electoral districts in the form of higher spending on local public goods,
providing no benefit to the abstemious representative’s district (Lockwood 2006 at 43-44).
Therefore, each voter supports spending on local public goods even when the cost in additional taxes
exceeds the value of the goods to the median constituent.  (Besley & Coate 2003).  Moreover, the
problem is not simply on of over-spending: Universalism could lead to under-spending as well,
because representatives have incentives to vote for the cheapest possible projects when assembling
a coalition, since the their cost if spread across the entire nation.  Expensive projects with high net
benefits are, therefore, not funded (Lockwood 2006, at 40-41).  In a universalistic legislature, the
budget is, in effect, a common-pool resource that individual legislators over-exploit for lack of a
dictator – say, a party boss – who could enforce a less wasteful allocation of resources (Inman & Fitts
1990).
The problem of universalistic expenditures is essentially a problem of a fiscal externality –
the externality of funding projects that have disuniform geographic benefits with uniform national
taxation.    One could imagine various centralized solutions to the problem  (Besley & Coate 2003,
at 26).   But federalism provides a plausible solution as well.  In theory – assuming that subnational
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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politicians were responsive to their constituents’ preferences – the voters residing within a
subnational  jurisdiction would insure that projects with low net benefits would not be approved, just
so long as those locally funded projects had modest spillover effects on neighboring jurisdictions.
 Federalism, therefore, looks like a solution to a legislative dysfunction, internalizing the externality
creating by uniform tax financing (Inman & Rubinfeld,1997 at 50-53).
2. Central Legislatures’ misallocation of local public goods resulting from predatory
majorities
  Unlike the problem of universalistic cross-subsidies, the problem of predatory legislatures
does not involve voters’ or legislators’ involvement in a self-defeating collective action problem.
Instead, predatory legislatures are assumed to be governed by unified majorities who exploit the
politically weak.  Brennan and Buchanan, for instance, offer a “Leviathan model” of government in
which legislators unite around an agenda of maximizing their budget under which  officials treat
such public revenue as personal wealth.  (Brennan & Buchanan 1980 at 9.2.36-9.2.41).  Voters
cannot control such tendencies because cycling of issues in any legislature with an open agenda
allows legislators to enact any legislative program through canny agenda setting. (Id. at 9.2.21-
9.2.35).   But the budget-maximizing power of subnational governments is constrained by the power
of taxpayers to flee Leviathan, so long as those subnational governments are governed by a hard
budget constraint, meaning that the national government must be barred from financing subnational
operations through intergovernmental grants (Id. at 9.9.36-42).
Barry Weingast offers a variant of the Leviathan model that is focused on protectionism
rather than budgetary expansion.   On Weingast’s model, the  national government is captured by
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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narrow coalitions of producers with an interest in suppressing market competition.  Federalism
preserves markets from these well-organized interests if subnational governments have exclusive
authority over economic affairs, because the protectionist efforts of any local cartel will be
constrained  by the capacity of competitive producers to migrate outside the protectionist jurisdiction
(Weingast 1995).   Weingast’s theory requires that the national government enforce a national open
market barring any subnational effort to erect tariffs walls around itself.  Like Brennan’s and
Buchanan’s theory, Weingast’s theory also requires that subnational governments must face a hard
budget constraint.
3.   The need for a theory of local voice
The model of central governments as predatory or cartelizing Leviathans has motivated
several defenses of federalism and localism.  Richard Epstein, for instance, defended judicial
enforcement of Article I limits on the Congress’ legislative powers on the ground that such limits
protect citizens from redistributive national legislation (Epstein 1987).  Likewise, Vicki Been has
argued that local governments’ capacity to extract benefits from land-use developers is constrained
by their capacity to exit predatory jurisdictions (Been 1995).  
The ability of citizens to flee oppressive subnational jurisdictions assumes that there will be
some non-predatory jurisdiction to which they can flee.  Otherwise, every migration will be from the
frying pan into the fire.  If one does not simply assume that local officials want to maximize real
estate values as part of one’s model (Epple & Zelenitz 1981), then one must offer some “demand-
side” account of local officials’ political motives.   Somehow they have to want to take in the
refugees from oppressive jurisdictions.  
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12Edward G laeser, for instance, argues that mayors might drive away members of the “English” ethnic group
to maximize the power of the “Irish” ethn ic group.  (Glaeser & Schleifer 2005).  Bryan Caplan argues that voters
themselves might migrate to jurisdictions with majorities of citizens sharing their political affiliation (Caplan 2001). 
Alain Mingat and  Pierre Salmon argue that politicians might shape their constituency by adopting “Left” or “Right”
policies that will induce the d isfavored constrituent to emigrate and the favored constituent to immigrate to the
jurisdiction (Mintgat & Salmon 1982).
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It is not obvious, however, that subnational officials want to attract new migrants.  The
Leviathan model assumes, for instance, that subnational politicians would want to avoid policies that
dissuade taxpayers and owners of capital from settling in the subnational jurisdiction.  But there is
a plausible  model under which the desire for re-election  leads subnational politicians to cultivate
a loyal political machine based on ethnicity or prior political affiliation by using redistributive
policies to drive away voters who oppose that machine.12   On another model, subnational politicians
are able to “disguise”  redistributive spending by padding the public payroll rather than through
outright confiscation of middle-class wealth (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly 2000).  Either policy might
impoverish the city, but there is no reason a priori to believe that urban voters are sufficiently well-
organized or well-informed to prevent such impoverishment.  After all, national politicians have
been known to take measures  – creating excessive budget deficits or adopting inflationary monetary
policies – that are economically short-sighted for short-term electoral reasons.  Might subnational
politicians be equally prone to ruining the local tax base by imposing confiscatory taxes or exactions
on local capital?   What precisely is the political feedback mechanism whereby city leaders are
induced to care about their jurisdiction’s fiscal survival?   Some attention to local voice would seem
to be at least an important supplement to the dominant mobility-base theories. 
II.  Voice-based justifications for  federalism
Public choice theorists tend to be mystified by claims that subnational governments are
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/plltwp/papers/114
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13The theory of voters’ rational ignorance was laid out in detail by Anthony Downs in 1957, but the essential
insight dates back to Joseph Schumpeter’s dismissive evaluations of voters’ cognitive capacity.  (Schumpeter 1953, at
262-63). 
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“closer” or “more accountable” to their constituents than national governments, finding such claims
 “difficult to pin down precisely” (Lockwood 2006, at 45)  or  “intractabl[e]” (Breton 1986, at 186).
Part of the difficulty might be public choice theory’s traditional suspicion that majorities of voters
can ever effectively control elected politicians (Green & Shapiro 1992).  But there is nothing
mysterious about the traditional defenses of small-scale democracy, and these defenses can be re-
stated in public choice terms without much difficulty.   One of the oldest insights of public choice
theory13 is  that individual voters lack an instrumental reason to cast an informed  ballot, because the
probability of their ballot’s being decisive is minuscule and,  political action being a public good,
their capacity to enjoy the benefits of a desired outcome will be undiminished by their failure to vote.
That citizens bother to vote at all, therefore, has been a perplexing paradox for public choice
theorists, a paradox that they try to resolve by pointing to voting’s non-instrumental value – say,
voters’ solidaristic or civic gratifications from casting a ballot or the sheer entertainment value
derived from watching a political horse race (Aldrich 1997).  
The conventional arguments in favor of subnational democracy can be re-stated in public
choice terms as efforts to reduce the costs and increase the benefits of electoral activities including
but not limited to voting.  Consider five hoary arguments that reducing the scale of a jurisdiction
makes government “more accountable” because of the  (a) greater homogeneity of subnational
populations, (b) lower costs of subnational electoral activities, (c) greater interest of those
populations in subnational outcomes, (d) greater information available in federal regimes, and (e)
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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greater capacity to facilitate cooperation between mutually suspicious groups with different political
identities.   These arguments are not necessarily consistent with each other.  Each, however,  fits
comfortably into the public choice theory of politics, as a response to the problem of rational
ignorance described by Downs. 
1.  Homogeneity of subnational populations’ interests
It is an ancient theme of republican political writing that differences in wealth or religion lead
to civil strife that ultimately subverts the republic.  James Madison’s Federalist #10  could be
described as turning this republican case for homogeneity on its head in arguing that smaller and
more homogenous republics would tend to be dominated by  “factions” – that is, groups motivated
by passion or interest –  that would make decisions inconsistent with justice or public interest.   But
both claims are consistent with the view that more stable majorities can form in smaller republics
than in larger republics, because the populations of the former are more homogenous than the
populations of the latter.    Although Madison did not regard such stability as a cause for celebration,
if one is worried that government will be dominated by a small number of  producers of
governmental services – contractors, bureaucrats, politicians, etc – then greater homogeneity of
interests is a benefit and not a bane.  Brennan and Buchanan, after all, base their assumption of
Leviathan-like behavior on the theory that representatives can evade constituent control by
manipulating agendas when there is no stable majority in the legislature.  Representatives with more
homogenous interests are less likely to be prone to cycling agendas that could manipulated by a
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canny agenda setter (Kuga & Nagatani 1974).14   To the extent that subnational governments have
more homogeneous populations than national governments, then ceteris paribus the likelihood of
stable majorities increases.  Put another way,  by insuring that there is greater similarity of
preferences among constituents and their representatives,  subnational politics weakens the
assumption of an unrestricted domain of preferences on which Arrow’s Possibility Theorem
depends.  
No public choice theorist to my knowledge has ever attempted to measure the difference in
homogeneity of preferences between states’ population within the United States and the national
population.  Obviously, the U.S. Constitution itself excludes certain issues such as monetary policy
and national defense from even the most heterogeneous subnational jurisdiction’s agenda.  But the
demographic similarity of the population might further limit the universe of possible preferences that
could win a majority vote: No one expects, for instance, that the “union shop” will be placed on the
Oklahoma legislature’s agenda, because pro-labor union sentiment is relatively rare among
Oklahomans compared to, say, New Yorkers.   But the degree to which demographic homogeneity
within a state excludes certain issues from discussion will vary radically between small and large
states. California and New York, for instance,  would seem to be demographic microcosms of the
nation, and it is a contested question whether different states’ populations have radically different
views on hotly contested “Culture War” issues like abortion and same-sex marriage.  (Fiorina 2006)
Reducing the scale of government from the federal to the state level, therefore, might not appreciably
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increase the ideological homogeneity of the government’s population: One would have to reduce the
scale even further to the county or sub-county level, where populations tend to be sorted not only by
race  and religion but also ideology.  (Bishop 2008).  In its extreme form, the argument based on
demographic homogeneity suggests a sort of unitary democracy rooted in social consensus that might
seem chimerical in an urbanized society with a high degree of cultural and economic diversity. 
There is, of course,  more to democracy than avoiding instability.  One might want also to
insure that the population of voters conducts a meaningful debate on issues about which reasonable
people can disagree, and, as Madison famously suggested, homogeneity of population reduces the
chance of such a debate.  Moreover, as suggested below, homogeneity of preferences might
undermine subnational “voice” by reducing the salience of subnational politics.  To the extent that
one’s goal is to insure that legislatures reflect the will of the median voter, however, reducing the
scale of government is a plausible mechanism by which to secure such a goal.   
2. Accessibility of politics in subnational electoral districts
The Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution  offered a second argument in favor of
small jurisdictions: By reducing the size of electoral districts, subnational governments reduced the
costs of elections, allowing more obscure candidates with fewer financial resources to compete
effectively.  Unlike  the argument from demographic homogeneity, the argument for smaller electoral
districts does not  rely on some sort of small-town social consensus to insure effective representation
of voters.  Instead, the Anti-Federalists assumed that subnational politics would be affected by the
same clash of economic and social interests prevalent at the national level.  For the Anti-Federalists,
the difference between the levels of government was that the national level’s larger electoral districts
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would tend to over-represent the interests of the “natural aristocracy” – that is, the well-educated,
well-connected, and well-heeled.  The intuition underlying the Anti-Federalist theory was that
contacting voters in a large electoral district would cost more money,  because there would be more
people to contact and because informal networks available to laypersons – neighborhoods,
workplace, church, etc – would be too limited to enable a candidate with poor financing to compete
with a better financed candidate.   
There is little doubt that the Anti-Federalists were correct to believe that size of electoral
district varies directly with the size of campaign expenditures.  (Hogan 2001, at 821-22; Hogan &
Hamm 1998). The average member of the U.S. Representatives raised roughly $2 million in 2005-
2006.  By contrast, expenditures in state elections tend to be much smaller, ranging from $10,000
per representative in states like Idaho that have electoral districts with very small electoral districts
to $500,000 in California’s much larger state senate districts.15   The Anti-Federalist explanation for
the greater cost of federal elections remains the working hypothesis of modern political scientists:
A larger population increases travel costs and requires use of more expensive mass media to
communicate with voters.  (Gierzynski & Breaux 1996, at 350-51).  Time counts for less and money
counts for more in larger jurisdictions.  As the Anti-Federalists observed, this varying need for
money could affect the relative power of different social classes:  There is evidence to suggest a
relationship between inequality of voice is exacerbated when political participation depends more
on contributions of money than on contributions of time.  Simply put, low- and high-income
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individuals have radically unequal amounts of money to spend on elections but much more equal
amounts of time.  As expenditures of time become less effective and mass media becomes more
effective, then one would expect electoral results to be more skewed to favor the well-off.  (Verba,
Schlozman, & Brady 1994, at 288-303).
What relationship does this traditional argument in favor of smaller electoral districts have
to public choice theory?   Public choice theory hypothesizes that political participation ought to
increase as the costs of such participation decline and the instrumental and non-instrumental benefits
of participation increase.  Given that both the costs of voting and the probability of casting the
decisive vote in even a small subnational jurisdiction are vanishingly small, one might expect that
changes in the scale of the jurisdiction would not have significant effects on the instrumental
incentives to vote.  Indeed, the evidence suggests that voting rates do not increase as size of
jurisdiction decreases.  However, one might expect that thicker forms of participation such as
contacting officials or showing up at hearings would increase as the size of a jurisdiction is reduced,
because reducing the size of constituencies and increasing the number of officials greatly reduces
the costs of such activity.  (Dahl & Tufte 1973)16   Eric Oliver has provided evidence confirming
these intuitions: Thicker forms of participation – contacting elected officials, showing up at hearings,
running or holding office – seem to increase as the size of a local governments’ population decreases
(Oliver 2001, at 42-52).  This finding confirms the much more limited finding of Dahl and Tufte that
residents in Swedish communes with no more than 8,000 people have higher rates of political
knowledge about, and contact with, local officials than residents of larger Swedish communes  (Dahl
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& Tufte at 62-65).   Eric Oliver finds that the effect of jurisdictions’ size on rate of participation
increases even in much larger communities containing 250,000 to a million residents.  These
findings reenforce earlier  findings that citizens are more likely to contact their elected state or local
representative than their federal representative (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1994) .  Oliver’s
evidence also suggests a causal theory: Residents of smaller jurisdictions feel more efficacious and
knowledgeable when engaging in thick participation in smaller jurisdictions (Oliver 2001, at 63-65),
and they are more likely to be recruited by neighbors and generally participate in mobilizing
networks in smaller jurisdictions (Id. at 61-62).  Again, these findings confirm the earlier findings
of Dahl and Tufte concerning relative sense of efficacy in national versus local government (Dahl
& Tufte 1973, at 56-63)  as well as findings by Elinor Ostrom and Gordon Whittaker that residents’
perception of police are more favorable in smaller jurisdictions (Ostrom & Whittaker 1999, at 192-
93). 
The claim that subnational governments are more accessible than national government for
citizen participation assumes that groups relying on mass participation enjoy few  economies of scale
in organizing lobbying efforts nationally rather than subnationally.  Examining only environmental
groups, Richard Revesz concluded that  there does not appear to be much evidence for such returns
to scale.  (Revesz 2001, at 561-71).    More generally, citizen groups – that is, groups with large
numbers of members who share diffuse ideological interests  –  tend to rely more on an “outside
strategy” of mobilizing citizens through  meetings of local chapters, letter-writing campaigns, writing
of op-eds, etc.  Industry groups, by contrast, tend to rely on an “inside strategy” of button-holing
legislators, showing up at agency hearings, or making campaign contributions.  (Berry 1999 at 379-
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85; Kollman 1998, at 34-49; Goldstein 1999, at 22-28).  It seems intuitively implausible to believe
that groups relying on an outside strategy would compete more effectively through centralization of
policy-making: If one’s comparative advantage is mobilizing large numbers of people through
personal contacts, then it is difficult to understand why one would choose to compete in a
congressional committee mark-up session or agency.  Whatever returns to scale that they would
enjoy would seem to be dwarfed by the greater scale returns of their opponents.   Revesz’s
description of environmental groups’ activities and organization lends support to this skepticism
about returns to scale in lobbying: Environmental groups tend to have federated structures with
numerous subnational chapters and intense state and local activism (Revesz 2001, at 583-614).
Shrinking the size of electoral districts is not costless. To the extent, for instance, that one
can shrink district size only by multiplying the number of districts, one might increase the costs of
universalistic spending described above:  More members of city council means more officials who
must be bought off with their share of pork to create a working majority (Baqir 2002).   The
advantage of subnational government is simply that one can reduce the size of electoral districts
without excessively multiplying the number of legislators in a single legislature: Even the largest city
council is likely smaller, and therefore less “porky,” than the Congress.
The evidence described above that scale affects democratic accessibility is sketchy and
inconclusive at best.  Robert Inman, for instance, has produced evidence suggesting democratic
participation, the likelihood of an orderly transition between governments, and political and civil
rights are higher in decentralized than unitary democracies, where the degree of decentralization is
defined by subnational governments’ share of national revenues .  (Inman 2008, at 15).  But this
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measure of decentralization, like every other, is controversial (Sharma 2006).   Other scholars using
different measures of decentralization find that federal regimes are more corrupt than unitary states.
(Treisman 2002).
 One might concede that reducing the scale of government increases a sense of civic efficacy
and, hence, frequency of political participation without also conceding that reducing the scale of
government is desirable.  After all, there is no a priori reason to believe that more  participation
leads to more efficient production of public goods.  If increased participation has no effect on public
outputs, then perhaps it would be better if people just stayed home and watched their favorite soap
opera or sports team.  To the extent, however, that reduction in the scale of government reduces the
costs of political participation, then such reductions can broaden the range of interests capable of
monitoring governmental decisions and thereby reduce the possibility of producer cartels’
dominating subnational decision-making.  Moreover, the public choice theorist cannot ignore the
value of participation as itself a “consumption good,” an output of government, because it is
precisely this value that is supposed by public choice theorists to explain the otherwise irrational
prevalence of political participation (Aldrich 1997).  If one regards civic trust in government as
ceteris paribus a local public good, then reduction in the scale of government more efficiently
produces this participatory good even if the record of subnational governments is no better than the
national government in producing outputs other than participation itself.  
3. Salience of politics in subnational government 
Reducing the costs of political participation, however, does not result in better representation
of residents unless residents are motivated to participate.  It is, therefore, useful to distinguish
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between the costs of political participation for the already mobilized resident and the costs of
mobilizing the otherwise apathetic resident.  As a convenient shorthand, I call the capacity of an
already-mobilized citizen to affect political outcomes, “access,” while I call the capacity of a political
system to mobilize an otherwise apathetic citizen, “salience.”    It is a familiar point that people are
mobilized by rival parties or interests seeking their support.  (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, at 74-76,
134-36)..  There is a longstanding view of political scientists that subnational politics lack a
sufficiently diverse array of interest groups, political parties, or attentive media to allow for much
mobilization through this political competition.  (McConnell 1967).  The result is that subnational
politics are said to be “accessible” in my sense of the term but also non-“salient” to all except those
with a large material interest in the outcome – for instance, government contractors, public
employees, local business elites, real estate developers seeking developing rights, or other elites with
concentrated interests in the provision of governmental services.  The school of so-called “regime
theory” in urban politics can be viewed as a species of the view that subnational politics are non-
salient: According to regime theorists, city politics are dominated by coalitions (or “regimes”) of
business elites and politicians who mute mass movements and popular demands by defining local
political agendas in terms of local business elites’ interests.  (Stone 1988).    There is also an
economic model presented by Bardhan and Mookherjee that implicitly relies on the non-salience of
local politics under which capture of local government by economic elites is more likely where one
political party dominates at the local level.  (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2000, at 137-38). The essential
assumption of Bardhan and Mookherjee is that political knowledge is a function of wealth and
campaign contributions by the wealthy – assumptions that are akin to the claims of regime theory
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and traditional political science that subnational politics are non-salient.
It is surely correct that the democratic accountability of subnational government is a function
of both access and salience.  One cannot assume that subnational governments are “closer to the
people” merely because  an individual can get easy access to subnational officials and their
constituents.  One must also show that subnational politics hold sufficient interest that the individual
will bother making the effort. 
Unfortunately, there is very little evidence about the relative salience of national and
subnational politics.  The classic literature from the 1960s simply declared that subnational politics
involved suppression of conflict over big issues without offering much in the way of evidence to
support the claim.  Grant McConnell, for instance, asserted  that “[m]aterial values are much more
characteristic of narrow than of broad constituencies,” (McConnell 1967, at 117),  but he did not
offer any evidence to support this assertion.  E.E. Schattschneider  offered a similar assertion based
on his theory that under-represented groups are best mobilized by conflict: In homogeneous
jurisdictions where such conflict is less likely, it logically followed  that mobilization is also less
likely ( Schattschneider 1960 at 1-19).  V.O. Key’s analysis was driven by his view that the
Democratic Party of the Solid South suppressed conflict to the detriment of the disadvantaged (Key
1950).  None of these claims about mobilization go much beyond the analytically true claim that
greater homogeneity of interest implies lower levels of conflict and, therefore, conflict-based
mobilization.   
There is, indeed, powerful evidence that broadening the scale and scope of social conflict
mobilizes a broader range of people to participate in politics, insuring more socio-economic equality
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in participation rates.  (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, at 238-45).   The relationship between diversity
and participation has been specifically confirmed in local politics with J. Eric Oliver’s finding that
greater racial or economic diversity within a local jurisdiction will lead to higher levels of “thick”
political activity such as lobbying an official, showing up at a rally, or running for office (Oliver
2001 at 82-93).   But it is not a priori true that subnational constituencies lack the social diversity
necessary to fuel mobilizing conflict: States can be populous and demographically diverse
jurisdictions.  At most, one can plausibly hypothesize an inverse relationship between access and
salience: As a jurisdiction’s population gets smaller, the costs of mobilizing the apathetic citizen will
increase (i.e., salience will decline), but the costs of participation for the already-mobilized citizen
will decrease (i.e., access will increase).  From the point of view of maximizing political
participation, the jurisdiction would reach it ideal size when gains from increasing the salience of
the issues addressed by the jurisdiction are offset by the losses of making in-person political
participation more costly.    
Both salience and access can be affected by technology and institutional choices.  Telephone
banks, C-Span, larger congressional staff, and the internet can reduce the costs of participating in
national affairs.  Likewise, one can design subnational institutions to be more or less salient.   Grant
McConnell, for instance, attributed the capture of  California’s politics to the prevalence of
specialized boards, commissions, and executive officials under the California Constitution
(McConnell at 182-90).   David Schleicher offers another  model in which local political competition
is suppressed because candidates run under national party labels even when national parties’
platforms have nothing much to do with locally important issues.  The result is that party labels
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convey no politically relevant information to voters, reducing the salience of elections and
contributing to one-party dominance of cities in which voters overwhelmingly adhere to a single
national political party even when they are divided on local issues.  (Schleicher 2007).   Schleicher
makes several recommendations for reforming election law  to encourage the creation of purely local
political parties that would reduce the problem of voter ignorance. 
To the extent that low salience is the result of contingent legal arrangements, then the case
for nationalizing issues to increase mobilization weakens considerably: One might simply reform
the subnational institutional arrangements.  In particular, the salience of subnational politics can be
affected by the legal definition of subnational jurisdiction’s legal powers.  National issues are simply
more interesting than subnational matters: War and peace, income redistribution, stabilization of the
economy against recessions, and monetary policy are simply more gripping than the policy menu
before state and local legislatures.  But that policy menu is not a fact exogenous to constitutional
decisions: To the extent that the stakes of subnational politics increase because subnational
governments are given more to do, one would expect that the quality and quantity of mobilization
for subnational politics would also increase.   
William Fischel has set forth a model for how the  high stakes of local decisions can improve
the quality of residents’ monitoring of local politicians.  According to Fischel’s “Homevoter
Hypothesis,” homeowners and other owners of undiversified interests in local real estate are
motivated to monitor local land-use decisions, because such monitoring is the only way that they can
protect an otherwise difficult–to-insure asset from regulatory changes that could reduce the value of
their investment. (Fischel 2001)    Critical  to Fischel’s theory of resident mobilization is that local
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governments’ regulatory decisions are capitalized into the value of immobile assets, because
potential homebuyers are well-informed about the ways in which local governments’ policies affect
real estate in the jurisdiction (Id. at 39-71).  To avoid driving away potential buyers from the local
market, local “homevoters” carefully monitor local governments’ decisions even when they do not
directly consume the services produced by local governments.  (Id. at 72-97).   Thus, childless
couples may nevertheless care about the quality of local public schools simply because they want
to maximize the value of their home.   Under Fischel’s model, in other words, citizen mobility
enhances immobile citizens’ voice  – a conclusion contrary to Hirschman’s familiar contrast between
“voice” and “exit.”
Fischel’s hypothesis rests on both a particular allocation of powers to local governments and
a particular sociological profile of local residents.  If those residents do not own undiversified shares
in local real estate – a down payment or other equity in their home, for instance – then they will lack
the incentive to monitor local politics.  Cities inhabited by renters on short-term leases would not
enjoy the benefits of resident monitoring hypothesized by Fischel.  Likewise, cities that lack control
over decisions affecting the value of the immobile asset that motivated local participation would not
inspire citizen participation with their policies.  The theory applies most powerfully, therefore, to
zoning and property taxation decisions in jurisdictions dominated by homevoters.  In such
jurisdictions,  Fischel rejects the idea pressed by “regime theorists” that land-use decisions are driven
by a “growth machine” of developers and downtown business owners (Molotch 1976).  Instead, local
governments with a majority of resident homeowners will reflect the will of the median (home)voter
and stop growth whenever the costs of growth to homevoters exceed growth benefits.
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The decisions of state governments are unlikely to be capitalized into the value of land
simply because homebuyers cannot generally choose between living in competing states.  Therefore,
Fischel’s theory does not explain how residents are mobilized to participate in state politics.
However, it is possible that the sheer existence of elected officials constitutes a further source of
subnational mobilization.17   If so, then subnational governments may have “voice” advantages over
the national government, because the ratio of  elected officials to appointed policy specialists is
greater at the subnational level.   The empirical literature seems to confirm the intuition that elected
and appointed officials behave differently from each other, with the former more attuned to the
wishes of majorities.  Studies of insurance and utility commissions both suggest that elected officials
are more likely to make pro-consumer decisions than appointed commissions, even controlling for
state fixed effects (Besley & Coate 2000; Formby, Mishra, &  Thistle 1995 (utility commissioners);
Fields, Klein, &  Sfiridis 1997(insurance commissioners)).   These specific studies seem to replicate
older and more general empirical evidence that elected officials  systematically differ in their
willingness to press broad claims of justice and organize unorganized political constituencies than
appointed policy experts.  (Aberbach, Putnam &  Rockman 1981, at 106-114).
The idea that elected policymakers will mobilize their constituents to participate in politics
is not necessarily comforting to public choice theorists who tend to regard political activity as merely
instrumentally valuable.   Mobilizing majorities to take exploitative or inefficient actions is hardly
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the sole benchmark of successful politics.   Public choice theory, however, relies heavily on the
notion of minoritarian tyranny – the idea that  predatory elected officials or producer cartels dominate
government in the name of the people, treating public revenue as personal wealth.  If reducing the
scale of democracy can improve access without reducing the political salience necessary for
mobilization, then subnational government is more likely to resist these minoritarian pressures than
national government.  Although empirical confirmation of the majoritarian benefits of subnational
government for “voice”-based accountability are sketchy, they are an important part of the public
choice case for federalism.
4. Costs of acquiring information about policy outcomes in federal regimes
Since Brandeis’ famous phrase in New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932),
subnational governments in federal regimes are said to be “laboratories of democracy” in which each
jurisdiction can learn from the successes and failures of neighboring jurisdictions.  The
“laboratories” metaphor implies that information rather than people or capital moves freely across
subnational borders: The advantage of federal regimes is, therefore, that they produce more
information than unitary states.  
A unitary state could theoretically launch pilot programs in subparts of the nation to obtain
information available in federal regimes.  Therefore, one would need some account for why
politicians in a unitary state would neglect such experiments absent some entrenching of federal
principles even when those experiments  could yield useful information.  One such account might
rest on the asymmetry of information between elected officials and constituents: If incumbents know
more about the actual costs of governmental programs than their constituents, then the former might
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want to suppress information that would deprive them of their informational advantage. 
Entrenching federal divisions of power might prevent the loss of information supplied by
neighboring jurisdictions’ performance.  (Salmon 2006 at 73-77).    Besley and Case test such a
model of “yardstick competition” by comparing governors’ reelection chances when their states’
taxation decisions run counter to the decisions of neighboring states.  They find some evidence that
voters vote against incumbents who increases tax burdens relative to the tax burdens imposed by
their neighbors.  (Besley & Case 1995).
Yardstick competition is more a method by which voters control costs of existing
governmental programs than promote novel experiments with new programs.  In this sense, yardstick
competition is only remotely analogous to Brandeis’ laboratories of democracy.  Economists have
been more skeptical about whether federal regimes induce subnational governments to experiment
with new policies.  The objection to such a “laboratories” theory, first formally modeled by Susan
Rose-Ackerman, is that information about new policies in one jurisdiction is a public good that
generates spillover benefits for neighboring jurisdictions.  Prudent politicians, therefore, have an
incentive to wait until  neighboring jurisdictions attempt an experiment and see how that experiment
fares in practice before they undertake the political risks of trying something new that might fail
(Rose-Ackerman 1980, at 604-05).
Rose-Ackerman’s proof rests on the assumption that subnational politicians have weak
incentives to seek higher office and, therefore, will not be motivated by the “first mover” advantage
of making an issue their trademark area of expertise (Id. at 615).  This assumption that politicians
ambitious for higher office do not take  risks in order to stand out from their competitors seems
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contrary to substantial empirical evidence.  (Schlesinger 1966 at 10).18     There remains, however,
an open question as to whether launching policy innovations from a subnational jurisdiction confers
any “first mover” advantage to an ambitious politician seeking higher office.   It might be that being
an imitator after an experiment has already been test-driven in a neighboring state is a better strategy
for winning name-recognition than being a pioneer.   The answer to this question rests on a difficult
and unresolved empirical issue of voter behavior – whether voters have the capacity and interest in
distinguishing political entrepreneurs from copycats, rewarding the former over the latter in their
quest for higher office (Galle & Leahy forthcoming 2009).
5. Cooperation among national subgroups with distinct political identities
Since John C. Calhoun published his theory of concurrent majorities in his Disquisition on
Government, political theorists have explained  federal regimes as a means for facilitating
cooperation among subgroups with distinct political identities that inhabit a single state.    Following
Feeley and Rubin, I define “political identity” to refer to those aspects of an individual’s culture,
interests, and beliefs that form the basis for his or her allegiance to a political community  (Feeley
& Rubin 2008 at 7).  While political identity might be based on shared language, religion, or
ethnicity, it could also be based on some shared economic interest or mode of life: Calhoun, for
instance, regarded slave-holding as a basis for group cohesiveness that seems akin to Feeley’s and
Rubin’s concept of “political identity.”  The critical point about political identity is that it creates
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loyalties sufficient to hold together a political alliance against the usual pressures of self-interested
defection.  Subgroups united by a common political identity, therefore, can form a stable winning
coalition if they capture control of the government.  Other subgroups, fearing exploitation at the
hands of a this coalition, may refuse to form a single state with the dominant subgroup, either by
seceding  from an existing state or refusing to form a new state, out of fear that they will otherwise
forever be excluded from political power.  But both secession or political independence will be a
self-defeating strategy for all subgroups insufficiently numerous  to sustain a state capable of
withstanding external military threats.  Therefore, subgroups confronting military conquest have
incentives to cooperate with each other by forming a federal alliance just so long as they can each
avoid being dominated by each other within that alliance.  William Riker, indeed, argued that, as a
positive historical matter, federal regimes are formed exclusively as a result of these incentives for
constrained cooperation between mutually suspicious groups as an effort simultaneously to resist
external military threats while avoiding internal political domination (Riker 1964 at 11-16).  
Whether such regimes are sustainable depends on whether they succeed in overcoming the
centripetal and centrifugal forces that lead either to the domination of a single dominant subgroup
or the secession of   subgroups that fear such domination.   The next section of the paper addresses
the literature various mechanisms – mutual vetoes by subgroups, judicial review, political parties that
keep divisive issues off the agenda, etc – that might make a federal regime sustainable.   The
question presented by this section is the distinct question of whether facilitating cooperation among
subgroups is normatively desirable in terms familiar to public choice theorists.  (Riker never
addressed this normative question, as he purported to offer a purely positive theory of federal
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cooperation).
One might re-phrase Riker’s positive argument in economic terms acceptable to a public
choice theorist by arguing that it is beneficial to facilitate cooperation among otherwise mutually
suspicious subgroups whenever the costs of either internal exploitation (through political domination
by a subgroup) or external exploitation (through military conquest) exceed the costs of  maintaining
the federal regime.   Federalism, in this sense, is an antidote to a problem that is exactly the opposite
of universalism.  In universalistic regimes, the governing coalition is so unstable that it can govern
only through inefficient cross-subsidies to every region of the nation.  In regimes dominated by a
single subgroup, the governing coalition is so stable that it can exploit all non-members with
impunity, extracting wealth from them to such an extent that they are provoked into attempts at
secession and civil war.  To appeal to the economic mindset of public choice theorists, one can
sidestep the usual distributive misgivings about such exploitation, which are, after all, highly
contingent on the specifics of who is exploiting whom.  (Northerners’ exploiting Southern slave
owners in post-Civil War United States by confiscating their slaves is not obviously a distributive
injustice, while Turks’ exploiting Kurds  in Turkey by banning the use of Kurdish might seem
intuitively unjust).  Putting  these considerations of political justice to one side, even a public choice
theorist or economist can appreciate that civil war might be more costly than credible commitments
to maintain mutually acceptable boundaries on each group’s power.   In this sense, public choice
theory can accept the idea that federal regimes could be normatively desirable as a means by which
to avert costly civil strife  between subgroups with weak allegiances to the larger nation.   Such a
defense of federalism is akin to Arend Lijphart’s defense of “consociation” in societies riven by
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strong ethno-cultural or religious divisions, in which cooperation is protected by institutional rules
that give each group some veto over collective decisions.    Where civil war or military invasion are
the only alternatives to consociational arrangements, then there is an intuitive sense that they make
normative sense.  (Lijphart 1968)
As Feeley and Rubin note, this justification for federalism would seem to have little
application to advanced industrial democracies like the United States in which the citizens feel a
strong sense of loyalty to the nation rather than any regional subgroup.  In the 21st century, there is
little danger of any civil war between, say, Hossiers and New Yorkers: Ties to regional cultures
simply are not very powerful compared to Americans’ shared sense of national citizenship.   For
Feeley and Rubin, therefore, federalism  is just a temporary halfway house between a true nation-
state with a full-blown concept of national political identity and a federation of polities that can
cooperation only in consociational terms because they lack such powerful national loyalties.  
Feeley and Rubin, however, may overlook the ways in which federalism can relieve national
politicians of the need to engage in fruitless and divisive debates over hotly contested cultural issues.
One can concede that Americans feel a primary sense of emotional loyalty to the nation rather than
to any region within the United States.  But it hardly follows that there are not many issues about
which Americans are more deeply divided at the national than at the subnational level.  Reserving
such issues for subnational decision is an obvious way to avoid divisive, protracted, and perhaps
unresolvable conflict in the national legislature.   
The national legislature might, of course, have sufficient political incentives to delegate such
issues downwards to subnational jurisdictions without any constitutional prompting.   But interest
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groups seeking the exclusion of an issue from the national agenda face a commitment problem:
While it might be in the long-term interests of all interest groups to avoid addressing  a divisive
issue, no interest group enjoying a legislative majority would forego the opportunity to pass such a
law absent a credible commitment from rival interests that those rivals will also forego such policy-
making when they enjoy a legislative majority.   Constitutionalizing a doctrine of enumerated powers
is one method for making such a credible commitment: By excluding certain divisive issues from
the national agenda altogether, such a doctrine frees each side of the disagreement from the
temptation to address the issue when they gain a temporary legislative majority.   
III. How is Federalism Preserved?  “Political Process” Theories of Federalism and the
Challenge of Public Choice Theory
Assume that one accepts the arguments offered above that federal regimes provide a solution
to problems of public choice plaguing unitary states.  The question then arises of how one sustains
the federal regime.  The obvious answer is that some appropriate rule could be enacted as part of a
constitution.  But the obvious answer has an equally obvious rejoinder: How can one be assured that
the terms of the federal arrangement will be enforced?  One cannot assume that the national judiciary
will enforce the constitution, because the process by which judges are appointed might be afflicted
by the same centripetal or centripetal tendencies that made the federal constitution necessary in the
first place.   
The conundrum of preserving federal regimes through judicial review has led legal scholars
and political scientists to seek some political mechanism for making federalism self-sustaining
through the national political process.  In what follows, I will outline this scholarship on “political
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process” theories of federalism.  In doing so, I will suggest  that “political process” theories must
meet a daunting challenge posed by normative justifications for federalism outlined in Parts I and
II of this chapter.  Merely protecting the power of state officials does not protect federalism unless
one can show that the particular sort of power being protected does something to alleviate the
dysfunctions of unitary states that federal regimes are hypothesized to cure.  A pervasive problem
with the scholarship defending “political process” theories of federalism is that they do not make this
link between their positive theory of national politics and some normatively attractive  theory of
federalism.
To understand the challenge posed for “political process” theories of federalism, it is helpful
to rehearse why the various theories of federalism outlined in Parts I and II cannot be vindicated by
ordinary electoral politics.  On one simple model, national politicians assign powers to that level of
government that maximizes their political support, and voters vote for those politicians who choose
policies that maximize the voters’ welfare.  (Macey 1990).    Driven by fear of voters’ displeasure,
national politicians delegate duties to national agencies only when these agencies will likely
outperform subnational agencies.  The result is ideally decentralized policy-making. 
Public choice theory, however, is committed to rejecting this simple model.  The premise of
all of the normative justifications for federalism offered in Parts I and II is that electoral processes
only imperfectly translate voters’ interests into legislative outcomes.  The costs of political
participation in large electoral districts, the costs of monitoring the budget effects of national
spending on local infrastructure, the power of producer cartels, all preclude voters from enforcing
norms of federalism at the ballot booth.  Voters’ imperfect information about the costs of different
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Federalism and Public Choice
Page 38 of  54
assignments of responsibilities  in a federal system means that national politicians do not fully
internalize the costs of their assignment decisions (Gillette 2000, at 1382-84): They may assign
politically risky functions to subnational officials even though those functions are properly national
(Macey 1990),  or they may  meddle in subnational infrastructure even though such spending wastes
the national budget.  If federalism is the answer to problems of political economy, in short, then
protecting federalism through mere elections puts the electoral cart before the institutional horse.
“Political process” theories, therefore, must provide  some  mechanism in addition to
elections to safeguard federalism.  Since Herbert Wechsler published  The Political Safeguards of
Federalism in 1954, both legal scholars and political scientists have proposed some mix of formal
constitutional institutions (for instance, bicameralism, equal representation of states in the U.S.
Senate, etc.) and informal political norms (for instance, decentralized or multi-sectional political
parties, numerous subnational elections, etc.) as limits on the national legislature’s power over state
governments.  Wechsler, for instance,  emphasized that the Congress was likely to be responsive to
the interests of state officials, because the U.S. Constitution’s formal rules gives state officials or
state constituencies an important role in selecting the membership of the Congress.  Larry Kramer
has emphasized that the organization of American political parties creates political alliances between
federal and non-federal politicians (Kramer 2000).    Bradford Clark has argued that the structure of
the national law-making process under Article I insures that Congress cannot easily preempt areas
of state legislative responsibility (Clark 2001).  In light of these political protections for federal
regimes, Jesse Choper has argued that principles of federalism ought generally to be deemed to be
non-justiciable by federal courts.  (Choper 1980).
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Less concerned with the  democratic illegitimacy of judicial review, political scientists have
offered a mix of formal constitutional institutions, informal political norms, and judicial enforcement
as devices by which federal regimes can be sustained.  (Fillipov, Ordeshook, &Shvetsova 2003;
Bednar, Eskridge, & Ferejohn 2001).  For instance, Fillipov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova argue that
American federalism has been sustained by a combination of the weak set of constitutional powers
enjoyed by Presidents, the numerous elections provided by traditions of state and local government,
and the decentralized and multi-sectional nature of American political parties, which require
Presidents to forge consensus from a wide array of subnational stakeholders in order to make
national policy.  (Fillipov et al. 2003, at 229-41).  Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn suggest that
judicial review can be added to the mix if the courts are sufficiently insulated from national
legislative power: They note that the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council successfully
protected provincial powers from the Canadian Federation for eighty years, enforcing the limits on
Federation power contained in Article 91 of the British North America Act until 1949, when
Parliament transferred the judicial function from the British imperial body to the Canadian Supreme
Court.   Because the judicial committee stood completely outside of the power of the Canadian
legislature, it could enforce federal rules more vigorously than a conventional national court.  But
they, too, rely heavily on informal political organization to sustain political decentralization in
nations lacking the anomaly of an extra-national court: the powers of Justices of the Peace in the
United Kingdom, for instance, lasted only so long as Parliament was dominated by non-
programmatic political parties.  (Bednar et al 2001, 243-46).
 Whatever the mix of formal and informal institutions, however, there is a difficulty with all
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such political methods for sustaining federal regimes. These theories show only that  political
processes can indiscriminately preserve subnational officials’ power, but preserving subnational
power is not a sufficient condition for normatively desirable federalism.   Federalism is a set of
normative theories concerned with ameliorating unitary democracy’s failure to translate individual
interests into political outcomes.  Indiscriminately promoting non-federal officials’ power does not
advance these normative theories.   Indeed, promoting state officials’ power could actually
exacerbate  the failures of unitary democracy that federal regimes are supposed to solve.  
For instance, if the point of federalism is to match tax burdens with expenditures and thereby
achieve fiscal equivalence, then Congress’ predilection for bestowing federal grant revenue on state
and local officials undermines does not promote federalism but undermine it: By breaking the link
between taxes and benefits, mere decentralization of expenditures through grants invites the sort of
over-use of public revenues that federalism was supposed to constrain.  (Rodden at 697).  Likewise,
if the point of federal regimes is to broaden political access by shrinking the size of electoral districts
and multiplying the number of elected officials, then fostering alliances between federal and state
bureaucrats undermines federalism rather than promotes it, because such alliances might insulate
non-federal agency specialists from the oversight of non-federal elected officials.19  Inducing
gridlock at the national level does not preserve federalism in any meaningful sense unless the
national legislature responds to the legislative “vetogates” by enacting only or primarily those
programs that serve  purposes that subnational jurisdictions are unsuited to pursue.  This is not,
however, how gridlock necessarily operates:  As Paul Peterson has argued, however, the national
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legislature may limit its power by devolving politically controversial poverty programs to the states
while retaining control over the more politically rewarding grants for local infrastructure.  (Paul
Peterson 1995). 
The futility of preserving federalism simply by protecting subnational power is well-
illustrated by what Fritz Scharpf   calls “the joint decision-trap” in German federalism.   Because the
Länder’s chief executives  maintained a veto over most domestic policy-making through their
representation in the Bundesrat, the political party that controlled a majority of the Länder could
frustrate the policies of the governing majority in the Bundstag whenever the two houses were held
by different parties.   The Länder’s veto certainly protected their political position in the federation
– but it also prevented most substantial policy reforms and forced the majority government to
purchase consent with exorbitant side payments to recalcitrant regions to equalize every Land’s fiscal
capacity  (Scharpf 1988).  The result is that individual Land are prevented from reaping many of the
fiscal benefits of their individual policy initiatives – exactly the opposite of what at least some
normative theories of federalism require (Larson 1999).  William Eskridge suggests that the “veto
gates” within the United States Congress can have an analogous effect on policy-making: By giving
different regions or factions a veto over policy, these “veto gates” force Congress to bundle together
several different policies into a single bill in order to facilitate majority log rolls, creating more
national legislation that is unrelated to the functional capacities of different levels of government.
(Eskridge 2008 at 1452).   
In short, the point of federalism is not simply to insure that state officials have a lot of power
but rather to insure that they have the right sort of power.   As Daryl Levinson notes,  “political
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process” theorists have understood federalism principles as an effort to constrain the national
government’s allegedly insatiable appetite for power  (Levinson 2005 at 938-44).  But Levinson
astutely notes that this factual premise is as erroneous as the normative aspiration: There is no reason
a priori to believe that the national government is inveterately avaricious for power as opposed to
simply lazy, and there is no reason to doubt that federalism as a normative theory can be destroyed
just as easily by federal under-regulation as by over-regulation.   
Despite Weingast’s argument to the contrary, however, it is difficult to argue that such a
system of vetoes could sustain the more subtle versions of exit-based federalism necessary for
market preservation or control of producer cartels.  As Rose-Ackerman and Rodden observe,
Weingast’s theory of market preservation assumes that some national actor will act vigorously to
suppress protectionist legislation by subnational jurisdictions, and it is difficult to imagine that a
national government mired in gridlock could perform this function.  (Rose-Ackerman & Rodden
1997).20   
This is not to say that a purely veto-based “political process” theory could not sustain any
normative theories of federalism whatsoever.  For instance, if the goal of federal regimes were
simply to insure that one of two factions with rival political identities did not capture the national
government and thereby dominate the other faction, then a system of what Calhoun called
‘concurrent vetoes’ might do the trick in sustaining the federal alliance.  Weingast makes a strong
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case that the “balance rule” in the U.S. Senate (under which the Southern slave-owning states
maintained sufficient seats to block legislation proposed by northern states) served this function until
1850 (Weingast 1995).  Likewise, if the only goal of the federal regime were to preserve the
existence of subnational governments as significant centers of policy-making, then “political
process”   theories based on gridlock might be sufficient.  Such a theory of federalism would be
unlikely to constrain universalistic legislation or protectionist state laws: Indeed, regional vetoes
might promote such inefficiencies and “joint decision traps.”  However, by preserving the power of
state elected officials, such a verison of federalism serves the goal of enhancing political access.  The
“political process” theories of self-sustaining federalism defended by public choice theorists, in
short, imply a focus on voice- rather than exit-based federalism.
IV. Conclusion
Public choice theory has come a long way since William Riker dismissed federalism as little
more than a device to protect American racism.  (Riker 1964, at 155).  But it needs to come farther.
The theory and evidence for why scale is relevant to exit-based accountability is well-developed in
the public choice literature, perhaps because the analogy between competitive firms and subnational
governments “selling” locational rights seems so intuitively plausible and seems to avoid the need
for collective expression of values and preferences.    But the exit-based account of subnational
government must be supplemented by some theory of subnational voice.  Important work remains
to be done in exploring whether and to what extent scale affects democratic accountability.  The
burden of this chapter is that this work fits neatly into the public choice tradition. 
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